A Distant Mirror is the third volume in the Hamburg Buddhist Studies series brought out by the Numata Center for Buddhist Studies at the University of Hamburg. The book as a whole, as well as each chapter individually, is freely available for digital download as PDF from the Hamburg University Press website (http://blogs.sub.uni-hamburg.de/hup/products-page/publikationen/125/). As the ‘Acknowledgements’ make clear (13), it is the result of the “Indian Buddhist Thought in 6th-7th Century China” project sponsored by the National Science Council of Taiwan, and held at National Chengchi University between 2009 and 2013. This project held numerous lectures and workshops under the three designated fields of: 1) Yogācāra Buddhism in China and Korea, 2) Buddhist logic and epistemology in China, and 3) the Indian elements in Chinese forms of Buddhist system (cf. 21). Detailed summaries (in Chinese) of the project as a whole and of all the individual contributions made by both well-established and emergent experts in these three fields may be consulted at http://nccuir.lib.nccu.edu.tw/bitstream/140.119/51954/1/98-2410-H-004-182-MY3.pdf.

The project of which A Distant Mirror constitutes the published fruit was explicitly designed “to explore boundaries between South Asian and East Asian Buddhist philosophy” (13). This orientation merits emphasizing, for there can be no doubt that the academic study of Buddhist philosophy in Western languages and universities has been inordinately dominated hitherto by what are conventionally referred to as its ‘Indo-Tibetan’ strands. Before delving into the

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1 Following the lead of many of the contributors, I have benefitted from and am grateful for comments made by Dan Lusthaus on a draft version of this paper.
contents of the book itself, it will thus be well to substantiate the book’s claim to be treating “virgin territory” (13) by “bring[ing] Indian Buddhist philosophy, especially epistemology and logic, into dialogue with the Chinese mind” (13). If nothing else, this will serve to underline the welcome originality of *A Distant Mirror*. Indeed, in what follows I have gone to some length in locating and explaining what I see to be the methodological as well as the philosophical value of this book precisely because I believe it begins filling a deep and under-appreciated lacuna in the field of Buddhist studies.²

To my knowledge, four English-language books have been published in recent years purporting to treat ‘Buddhist Philosophy’ as a whole. In chronological order, these are: 1) *Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction* by Mark Siderits; 2) *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy* by Stephen J. Laumakis; 3) *Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings* edited by William Edelglass and Jay L. Garfield; and 4) *A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy* edited by Steven M. Emmanuel. Unfortunately, and despite the implicit universality of their titular claims, all four sideline, if not altogether ignore, Chinese, and more broadly East Asian, Buddhist philosophy. Siderits’ monograph is the clearest example of this tendency as, despite its claim “to introduce Buddhist thought,”³ it is in fact limited to Buddhist philosophy only from the Buddha to Dignāga, to the complete exclusion of any non-Indian strands of Buddhist thought.⁴ Of the 263 pages of text in Laumakis’ work, meanwhile, the first 174 treat Indian Buddhist philosophy, and of the four remaining chapters, not one exclusively deals with Chinese varieties of Buddhist thought.⁵ Turning to the two edited collections, Emmanuel’s section

2 I say ‘begins’ for the abundance of primary source material means that the volume’s several chapters, limited in scope and length, necessarily leave vast swathes of territory unexplored.
3 Siderits 2007 i (blurb).
4 The only mention of non-Indian Buddhist thought, occurring in the final paragraph of text, is breathtaking in its degree of understatement: “And there are also interesting developments when Buddhist philosophy gets taken up in Tibet and in East Asia” (Siderits 2007 229).
5 For the record, the four chapters are §9 ‘Bodhidharma’s and Huineng’s Buddhisms’, §10 ‘Pure Land Buddhism’, §11 ‘Tibetan Buddhism’, and §12 ‘Two forms of contemporary Buddhism’. §11 is unproblematically situated within Indo-Tibetan studies, and §12 treats the Dalai Lama and Thich Nhat Hanh. As for §9 and §10, even these chapters, which one might expect to be devoted to Chinese/East Asian Buddhist thought, turn out on close inspection to be only peripherally so. Although §9 is avowedly “concerned with the history and development of the Chinese appropriation of Buddhism” (175), even here the bulk of the text does not treat Chinese Buddhist philosophy directly, but rather traces the history of Buddhism’s transmission
on ‘Major Schools of Buddhist Thought’ has one chapter each on ‘Theravāda’, ‘Indian Mahāyāna’, ‘Tibetan Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna’, and ‘East Asian Buddhism’. Not only does this grant three quarters of the relevant discussion to the Indo-Tibetan traditions, but it also effectively lumps all the East Asian schools of thought of China, Japan, and Korea under one head. Finally, of the thirty-eight Essential Readings included in Edelglass and Garfield’s anthology, a full twenty-three introduce and translate Indo-Tibetan Buddhist texts. Indeed, the number of texts originating from India alone (nineteen) is equal to the number of texts from all other Buddhist traditions, with only four readings reserved for Chinese texts.

While it is of course natural that individual scholars should concentrate on their respective fields of specialization, it is regrettable that monographs and edited collections such as these, ostensibly introductions to Buddhist philosophy tout court, should effectively turn out to be quite limited in their purview. I have surveyed these introductory texts, as opposed to the slew of more specialized works, precisely so as to highlight the prevalence (largely unacknowledged let alone questioned) of Indian and Indo-Tibetan philosophy over Chinese and (to use the analogously problematic but nevertheless widely current moniker) Sino-Japanese Buddhist varieties. Although every one of the afore-cited books is excellent on its own terms, surely East Asian Buddhist philosophy merits more than a passing mention in works designed to introduce Buddhist Philosophy. Of course, book titles are often less the result of authorial or editorial choice as of publisher imposition and, given that a broader title may well attract a wider readership and hence lead to greater sales, the choice of titles I have cited may well be due more to market forces than any unquantifiable intellectual ideals. This does not affect the substantive content, however, which, as demonstrated, is decidedly skewed in all four cases.

from India to China, introduces Confucianism and Daoism, outlines the teachings of Bodhidharma (an Indian), and sketches the reception of the Lotus Sutra (an Indian text), with only pp.197-203 explicitly concerned with Chinese Buddhist philosophy per se. Lastly, the discussion of Pure Land Buddhism in §10 is in fact mainly taken up with Indian Buddhist forerunners of East Asian forms, with only pp.221-227 explicitly devoted to Chinese and Japanese Pure Land. All told, then, we are left with some dozen pages in total directly addressing East Asian Buddhist philosophy.

For the record, these only account for 4 of the 44 chapters in the entire volume. In total, however, a full 30 (i.e. over two-thirds) of these deal wholly or mainly with Indo-Tibetan sources. Given that 8 (§§34, 35, 39-44) are heterogeneous in their sources and thus elude easy geographical classification, this leaves only 6 chapters (§§7, 11, 12, 16, 22, 33, i.e. less than one-seventh) wholly or mainly on East Asian Buddhist philosophy.
Allow me to emphasize that none of these preceding comments should be taken as criticism of the study of Indian or Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. There can be no doubt as to the tremendous philosophical import of the various thought traditions subsumed under these over-arching rubrics, and their study is therefore rightly central to the academic field. However, there can likewise be no question that Chinese Buddhism (not to mention the extant or extinct Buddhism of what are now Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Mongolia…) make and/or made great contributions to Buddhist philosophy and intellectual culture more generally. As such, it is unfortunate that this and these forms should continue to be peripheral to the academic study of Buddhist philosophy. After all, that the study of Buddhist thought in the West arose historically in the 19th century as a derivative from the philological study of Indo-European languages and texts is a fact, but that this circumstance should continue to define the contours of Buddhist philosophical studies in the 21st century is indefensible.

My critique is in like manner directed toward statements to the effect that the study of Buddhist philosophy in the West has been dominated by Indo-Tibetan objects “because South Asian and Tibetan Buddhist thinkers have tended to ask questions and pursue philosophical investigations in a manner much more akin to that of Western philosophers than that of many Chinese and East Asian thinkers before the modern era.” Not only is this position highly questionable, but if used as a methodological justification rather than as a historical statement of fact, then it would entail that we should refrain from studying philosophies framed divergently from our own – hardly a stance likely to engender much learning. As for the common claims that Tibetan materials preserve more ‘accurate’ and/or ‘sophisticated’ versions of Indian Buddhist texts and ideas, the former position is rendered highly problematic simply by the fact that Tibetan translations of and commentaries to originally Indian works almost invariably post-date their Chinese counterparts (where both exist), and this often by several centuries. Finally, the refinement and complexity (not to mention sheer quantity) of Chinese Buddhist philosophical texts, as articulated in response to their Indian antecedents, should become amply apparent upon reading *A Distant Mirror* – and a fortiori, of course, upon reading the original texts themselves.

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7 Edelglass 2013 485-486.
8 I should add that Edelglass is, on my reading at least, *not* using this position as a methodological justification, but rather as a historical statement of fact; one, moreover, that he then adduces as evidence for the fact that “Buddhist traditions are vast and diverse” (486).
All of this should go some way toward highlighting the importance of *A Distant Mirror* as a corrective to (rarely admitted but nonetheless) persistent academic assumptions according to which Chinese Buddhism is a syncretic deviation from some “pure or unadulterated” Indian ur-form of Buddhism. It would be well in this context to quote its editors’ formulation of their choice of title, as this eloquently echoes, and thereby hopefully justifies, my foregoing harangue. Lin and Radich write (15-16):

> We intend our title to encapsulate a methodological intuition, which we believe runs as a common thread through almost all of the studies collected here – that scholars should seriously consider the possibility that a wider set of features of the Chinese tradition, treated carefully, might serve us as a ‘distant mirror’ accurately displaying features common to Buddhism and elsewhere outside China.

In other words, the studies in this volume typically set out to explore, in some detailed case, the possibility that even where Chinese Buddhism appears in some respect or degree to depart from what we know of its Indian counterparts, Chinese developments might still in some ways inform us about ‘genuine’ Buddhism (to use a dangerous turn of phrase), rather than representing mere distortions of, or departures from, an Indian gold standard.

As such, this edited collection is not first and foremost a philosophical study of various features of Chinese Buddhist logic and epistemology, nor is

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10. This is taken from the title of Barbara Tuchman’s book on the history of fourteenth-century Europe, itself already co-opted by Jan Nattier in a section on ‘A Distant Mirror: Studying Indian Buddhism through Chinese and Tibetan Texts’ in Nattier 2003 (cf. 15).

11. Representative works in this field include (in English) Kurtz 2011 and the special issue of the *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* edited by Zhihua Yao (2010a), as well as (in Chinese) Fang 2002 and Yu 2009. Mention must also be made of the pioneering work of Giuseppe Tucci in this field (see e.g. Tucci 1929). It should be noted, however, that the majority of Chinese-language works on Buddhist logic and epistemology, like their European-language counterparts, treat of Indian, as opposed to Chinese, Buddhist logic and epistemology; see e.g. Shen 2007, Lin 2006, and the various important works of Weihong Zheng cited by Zamorski in his contribution to the volume (cf. 181-182). All these works include extensive bibliographies; here and in the following note I intend only to invoke some of the major contributions, but I am all too aware of the inadequacy of my lists.
rather, although contributing to both these fields, *A Distant Mirror* seeks to investigate Chinese contributions to philosophical debates (also) occupying Indian Buddhist minds. In so doing, the book tries to strike a balance between what the editors refer to as two methodological errors: that of incautiously taking Chinese characterizations of Indian Buddhist philosophical issues at face value without adequately considering the originality of Chinese contributions; and that of more or less dismissing Chinese inputs as uniquely, parochially, Chinese and hence of little use in reconstructing Indian Buddhist philosophical arguments (cf. 17). Instead, by “considering the ideas of Chinese authors and thinkers as independent or alternative developments, equally valid, of ideas and systems also known in India” (17-18), the contributions to *A Distant Mirror* effectively rehabilitate Chinese contributions to Buddhist philosophy as themselves independently worthy of reflection, and simultaneously demonstrate various ways in which such Chinese contributions may profitably illuminate their Indian Buddhist counterparts.

It is well worth noting that this two-fold approach mirrors (!) some of the most sophisticated work currently being produced in the Western academic study of Buddhist philosophy. Thus, it is common practice for Buddhist scholars to draw upon the Western philosophical canon in an effort to both demonstrate the inherent intellectual value of Buddhist philosophical ideas, and elucidate the means by which these may prove valuable to philosophical debates current in the Western context. Such aims have been forcefully expressed by Jay Garfield in several of his own and his co-edited volumes. In his treatment of *The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind*, meanwhile, Dan Arnold weaves together “philosophical ideas and arguments drawn from an exceptionally long list of heavy hitters in modern and contemporary (Western) philosophy (Kant, Sellars, Dennett, McDowell, Locke, Hume, Wittgenstein, Fodor… just to name a few).” Analogous comments

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12 Representative works in this field include (in English) Shinohara and Schopen 1991 and McRae and Nattier 2012, as well as (in Chinese) Ran 1995 and Huang 2008. Mention must also be made of the pioneering work of Kenneth Ch’en (see e.g. Ch’en 1964) and Erik Zürcher (see e.g. Zürcher 1972) in this field.


14 Arnold 2012.

15 Holder 2015.
could be made regarding Dan Lusthaus’ treatment of *Buddhist Phenomenology*,\(^{16}\) which draws extensively from 20\(^{th}\) century Continental thinkers such as Deleuze, Derrida, Husserl, Levinas, Lyotard, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur as well as canonical mainstays such as Berkeley, Nietzsche, and Spinoza; or (to give one final example) Brook Ziporyn’s *Philosophical Experiments with Tiantai Buddhism*,\(^{17}\) which not only adds extended discussions of Bataille, Davidson, Frege, Freud, Hegel, Lacan, Sartre, Schopenhauer, and Whitehead to the list (not mention somewhat, ahem, peripheral figures to the Western philosophical canon such as Woody Allen, Bugs Bunny, and Groucho Marx), but could well be read *in toto* as a deliberate (and highly original) attempt to graft Chinese Buddhist ideas onto Western philosophical questions.

All of this is proffered as evidence of the prevalence, and more importantly utility, of inter-weaving Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophy in relevant contemporary scholarly literature. Such an approach has led, and continues to lead, to some of the most philosophically interesting discussions and applications of Buddhist philosophy published in recent decades. Where *A Distant Mirror* differs from these approaches, of course, is in drawing not on sources vastly removed temporally, spatially, and culturally from Buddhist contexts, but from the direct Chinese heirs to Indian Buddhist philosophical thought. If any doubts remain as to the validity of using Chinese Buddhist sources to illuminate Indian Buddhist philosophical arguments, then surely such doubts should invalidate all the more the common (and, again, philosophically highly fruitful) practice of using non-Buddhist sources from the Christianate Western philosophical traditions to illuminate Buddhist philosophy, whether its geographical provenance is South- or East-Asian. Conversely, if it is fine to read Dharmakīrti via Berkeley or Zhiyi via Derrida, then surely it is at least as fine to read Dignāga via Huiyuan or Vasubandhu via Xuanzang.

Turning now to a more direct review of the volume’s contents, the editors provide a useful one-paragraph summary of each contribution in their ‘Introduction’ (22-31). In doing so, they divide the book into three major sections: 1) ‘Logic and epistemology’ comprising the chapters by Funayama Toru (船山徹), Chen-kuo Lin (林鎮國), Shoryu Katsura (桂紹隆), Shinya Moriyama (護山真也), and Jakub Zamorski; 2) ‘Yogācāra ideas and authors’, comprising the chapters by Ching Keng (耿晴), A. Charles Muller, Junjie

\(^{16}\) Lusthaus 2002.

\(^{17}\) Ziporyn 2004.
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Chu (褚俊傑), and Zhuhua Yao (姚治華); and 3) ‘Other Indian ideas’, comprising the chapters by Hans-Rudolf Kantor, Chien-hsing Ho (何建興), Yoke Meei Choong (宗玉嬋), Michael Radich, and Michael Zimmermann. In terms of structure, use of the book would have been facilitated by formally repartitioning it according to this or some such schema in the ‘Contents’, particularly as the book’s chapters follow the order of sections adumbrated in the ‘Introduction’. As it stands, the ‘Contents’ simply lists the chapters serially, without any section-headings or even numbering – a minor but unfortunate omission.

The main body of *A Distant Mirror* begins with the chapter by Funayama Toru entitled ‘Chinese Translations of *Pratyakṣa*’ (33-61). Funayama’s piece is centrally concerned with Chinese translations and interpretations of the Sanskrit term *pratyakṣa* (direct perception) as *xianliang* (現量). The first half of the chapter traces translations of *pratyakṣa* pre-dating Xuanzang (玄奘, 600/602-664), whose translations from Dignāga (陳那, ca. 480-540) initiated the systematic study of *pramāṇa* theory (因明, means of valid cognition) in China. Thus, Funayama initially demonstrates that Xuanzang himself did not employ *xianliang* consistently throughout his opus, sometimes using *xian* (現) alone, *xianjian* (現見), or *xianzheng lian* (現證量) in its stead. Funayama then works through earlier uses of *xianliang* by translators such as Pimuzhixian (毘目智仙 *Vimokṣa-prajñā-ṛṣi, 6th c.) and Qutan Liu (瞿昙流吉 i.e. Prajñāruci 般若流吉, also known as Gautama Prajñāruci 瞿曇般若流吉, fl. 538-543), Jingying Huiyuan (淨影慧遠, 523-592), and Prabhākaramitra (波羅頗蜜多羅 /波羅頗迦羅蜜多, 565-633), as well as alternative translations of *pratyakṣa* by Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什, ca. 350-409), Tanwuchen (昙無訥, 385-433), Guṇabhadra (求那跋陀羅, 394-468), Jijiaye (吉迦夜, fl. ca. 472), Bodhiruci (菩提流支, d. 527), and Paramārtha (真諦, 499-569).

These sources lead Funayama to conclude “that *xianliang* had already been used before Xuanzang… and that as a translation, *xianliang* corresponds to *pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam*, and not to *pratyakṣa* in the strict sense” (46). In the second section of his piece, Funayama moves temporally on from Xuanzang to determine how the term *pratyakṣa* was understood, and ‘sinified’, by later Chinese scholar-monks. Funayama argues that what he takes to be the artificial and ambiguous nature of the term *xianliang* “guided later scholars in the direction of philosophical developments different from those seen in Indian

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18 Funayama mistakenly has 淨影寺慧遠.
Buddhism.” (50) Funayama thus traces original Chinese understandings of the term in the work of Xuanzang’s direct disciple Kuiji (窺基, 632-682), Jingyan (淨眼, d.u.), Tankuang (曇 quán, 8th c.), and Zhixu (智旭, 1599-1655); understandings which make “sense only in the Chinese language, and not in Sanskrit” (53). On this basis, Funayama concludes by stating that “It is almost meaningless to say, on the basis of Indic language, that the Chinese way of understanding xianliang was a mistake. Rather, it can be evaluated as a new type of development. In this sense, it is an interesting example of what is called the ‘Sinification of Buddhist Concepts’” (58).

The chapter by Chen-kuo Lin, entitled ‘Epistemology and Cultivation in Jingying Huiyuan’s Essay on the Three Means of Valid Cognition’ (63-99), focuses on Huiyuan’s San liang zhi yi (三量智義: Essay). Lin’s stated aim is “to show that the Chinese reception of Indian Buddhist epistemology before the era of Xuanzang was far more significant than has been previously assumed” (63-64). His chapter can helpfully be divided into three major sections. In the first (63-69), Lin provides “a brief historical picture of the way that Buddhist epistemology was introduced from India to China during the fifth and sixth centuries” (64). Following a chronological sketch to this effect, Lin focuses on a topical reconstruction dealing with “first, theological issues, such as arguments for the existence of a soul (ātman, puruṣa) and cosmic creators (Īśvara, Viṣṇu); second, the metaphysical problem of the existence of the external world; and third, the relationship between epistemology and meditation” (65). In the second major section (69-84), Lin embarks on the doctrinal study of Huiyuan’s Essay, which itself is a chapter from Huiyuan’s major work, A Compendium of the Great Vehicle (大乘義章). Lin’s analysis is structured in terms of Huiyuan’s own threefold understanding of pramāṇas (量) as pratyakṣa, anumāṇa, and āptāgama.  

19 Lin translates 量 on its own consistently as ‘means of valid cognition’, but he leaves it unmarked when translating Huiyuan’s text. Thus, for example, xianliang (現量) is consistently translated as ‘perception’ rather than, say, ‘perception as a means of valid cognition’ – effectively the Chinese equivalent of Sanskrit pratyakṣa rather than pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam. Lin’s rendering is thus freer than that necessitated by the finely-grained analysis of these and related terms’ translation histories as detailed in the previous chapter by Funayama.

20 Lin states that this “is rendered in Chinese by xian (現)” (72), but it appears consistently as xianliang (現量) in Huiyuan’s text, the which compound term Lin translates consistently as ‘perception’.

21 Chinese biliang (比量), which Lin translates consistently as ‘inference’.

22 Chinese jiaoliang (教量), which Lin translates variously as ‘authoritative teaching’, ‘authority’, ‘teaching’, or ‘scripture’.
Throughout, Lin’s focus is on Huiyuan’s epistemology as it relates to ontology and meditation. For Huiyuan, epistemology and ontology will make no sense if they are not placed within the context of meditation. Hence, it is the main aim of this paper to demonstrate that only when the context of epistemology and meditation has been properly exposed are we able to fully understand the soteriological project in the early stage of Chinese Buddhist logico-epistemology (71).

Finally, the last section of Lin’s chapter (85-97) is an appendix comprising a complete English translation of Huiyuan’s Essay. The slight inconsistencies in Lin’s translation choices I have noted (which lead the translation to be a little free at times but at no point incorrect) do not overly detract from what is otherwise a fine rendering of a text Lin correctly identifies as “a gem among early Chinese Buddhist epistemological treatises” (63).

Shoryu Katsura’s chapter, entitled ‘The Theory of Apoha in Kuiji’s Cheng weishi lun Shuji’ (101-120), is the first of two dealing principally with Kuiji. In this chapter, Katsura’s stated goal is “to show the traces of the transmission of Dignāga’s theory of *apoha* in Kuiji’s work, which will indicate that Xuanzang, though he did not translate [Dignāga’s main work, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, 集量論] & [Dignāga’s auto-commentary or *Svavṛtti*] into Chinese, must have discussed [it]” (105). Katsura thus demonstrates that Kuiji refers to and indeed develops on Dignāga’s theory of *apoha* in his *Cheng weishi lun Shuji* (成唯識論疏, 唯識論述記), a commentary to Xuanzang’s *Cheng weishi lun* (成唯識論). The importance of Katsura’s contribution lies in the fact that, since “Yijing’s (義淨, 635-713) translation of Dignāga’s masterwork… did not survive, it has been easy for modern scholars to assume that classical Chinese Buddhist scholars did not know *apoha* theory” (23) – an assumption Katsura’s chapter seeks to undermine. This he works toward initially through a survey of Dignāga’s own theory of *apoha* in its epistemological and, more briefly, semantic aspects. He then outlines Kuiji’s own relevant positions with ample and extended citations from his primary text to argue for five conclusions.

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23 The Chinese source text is given as T44:1851.670c-672a.
24 Katsura defines this in Dignāgan terms as “exclusion/negation, or more precisely, ‘exclusion/negation of others’ (anyāpoha/anyavyāṛtti)” (104).
25 Kuiji’s commentary is also well known in Chinese as 成唯識論疏, 唯識論述記, and 唯識述記.
One, as per Dignāga, Kuiji posits perception (pratyakṣa, 现量) and inference (anumāna, 比量) as the only two means of valid cognition (pramāṇa, 量), which respectively cognize the particular characteristic (svalakṣaṇa, 自相) and general characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa, 共相) of an object. Two, Kuiji “defines the general characteristic as ‘exclusion of others’ (zheyu 遮餘)” to conclude that “the exclusion of others is the general nature and function of conceptual cognition” (118). Three, and still following Dignāga, Kuiji argues that the particular characteristic “is beyond the reach of conceptual cognition. Thus, it cannot be expressed by any verbal designation (yanshuo 言說)” (118). Departing from Dignāga, however, Kuiji then goes on to argue along Mahāyāna lines that, four, “ultimately speaking, even the general characteristic cannot be expressed by any verbal designation” (118). Finally, Kuiji proposes a hierarchy between both particular and general characteristics, whereas Dignāga had viewed only that latter as hierarchically related.

The chapter by Shinya Moriyama, entitled ‘A Comparison between the Indian and Chinese Interpretations of the Antinomic Reason (Viruddhāvyabhicārin)’ (121-150), is principally concerned with Kuiji’s Yinming ru zhengli lun shu (因明入正理論疏), his great commentary to the Nyāyapraveśa[ka] (因明人正理論) or Introduction to Logic generally ascribed to Śaṅkarasvāmin (商羯羅主, 6th c.). Specifically, Moriyama is concerned “to demonstrate the originality of Kuiji’s interpretation [of antinomic reason] when compared with various interpretations by Indian commentators on the [Nyāyapraveśa]” (122). Moriyama thus devotes some time to detailing the Indian Buddhist understandings of antinomic reason espoused by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti (法称, 6/7th c.), as well as the Jain interpretations of Haribhadrasūri (8th c.) and Pārśvadevagaṇi (13th c.). In general, viruddhāvyabhicārin is unique among what Dignāga calls the set of inconclusive reasons (anaikāntika) among fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa) in that, “whereas the inconclusive nature of the others is based on their not fulfilling the three characteristics of a valid logical reason (trairūpya 因三相), the antinomic reason does fulfill the three

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26 Kuiji’s position is spelled out at T1830:43.288b15-21, which is cited and translated by Katsura on 113.

27 Moriyama uses Nyāyapraveśaka as the title throughout instead of the more usual Nyāyapraveśa, even though he admits that this is in accordance with Jain practice as opposed to “the Tibetan and Chinese traditions” (n2, 121). I have preferred to side with the standard rendering. Note also that Moriyama makes subsidiary use of Kuiji’s Dacheng fayuan yi lin zhang (大乘法苑義林章).
characteristics” (122) but contradicts other propositions of its proponent and thereby drives her/his “position into self-contradiction” (139). Moriyama presents Kuiji’s understanding of antinomic reason as “a complex mix of insight, original thought, and misunderstanding of Indian ideas” (25). Thus, as an example of the latter, Kuiji interprets the term viruddhāvyabhicārin (相違決定) as legitimately either a genitive tatpurusa compound (i.e. to mean 相違之決定), which is indeed grammatically permissible in Sanskrit, or as an instrumental tatpurusa compound (i.e. to mean 決定令相違), which as Moriyama points out is grammatically impermissible. Insightfully, however, Kuiji introduces three novel ways to classify the fallacy of antinomic reason: 1) as based on the parameters of the particular debate in which it is being used (cf. 139-143); 2) as a subset of “the fallacious thesis called ‘thesis contradicted by another inference’ (anumānaviruddha)” (140); and 3) as itself typologically categorizable according to the four types of ‘contradictory reason’ (viruddha) proposed by Dignāga (cf. 140). In all, Moriyama’s chapter succeeds in showing “that the dynamics at work in the production of distinctive East Asian interpretations of Buddhist ideas can be complex, and irreducible to simplistic models” (25).

The final chapter in the section on ‘Logic and epistemology’ is that by Jakub Zamorski entitled ‘The Problem of Self-Refuting Statements in Chinese Buddhist Logic’ (151-182). This segues neatly from Moriyama’s contribution in that it begins with and will go on to treat in detail an issue raised by Xuanzang’s translation of Śaṅkarasvāmin’s Nyāyapraveśa, as well as of Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha. Within these treatises, Zamorski singles out two examples of ‘pseudo-theses’ (pakṣābhāsa 似宗): 1) “My mother is that barren woman” (我母是其石女), and 2) “All statements are false” (一切言皆是妄) (both 152). These statements, Zamorski proposes, “all Chinese (and in fact all East Asian) commentators of Indian treatises on Buddhist logic regarded… as two samples of one and the same fallacy, labeled according to the text of the Introduction to Logic [i.e. Nyāyapraveśa] as ‘inconsistency with one’s own words’ (zi yu xiangwei 自語相違, after Sanskrit svavacanaviruddha)” (153). Although both of the cited examples are “untenable on logical grounds...

28 Katsura has already spelled out the repartitioning of fallacious reasons in Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha (因明正理門論) or Gate of Logic as threefold: “the pseudo-thesis (pakṣābhāsa, sizong 似宗), the pseudo-reason (hetvābhāsa, siyin 似因) and the pseudo-example (drṣṭāntābhāsa, siyu 似喻)” (103).
alone” (154), traditional Western logic would consider them as distinct; the first being “classified as *contradictio in terminis* or *contradictio in adiecto*, a statement whose predicate is in conflict with its subject” (154), and the second being “a canonical example of a statement that is both self-referential and self-refuting” (154) – a variation on the well-known Liar’s Paradox. With all this in mind, the stated aim of Zamorski’s paper is to analyze the interpretations of these sentences by “Chinese commentators to see how they approached the logical problems involved” (155). Specifically, Zamorski focuses on the commentaries by Wengui (文軌, d.u.) in his *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (因明入正理論疏), Shentai (神泰, d. u.) in his *Li men lun shuji* (理門論述記), and Kuiji (窺基, 632-682) in his own *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (因明入正理論疏 or, as it became known, Da shu 大疏). Zamorski then goes on to briefly survey later interpretations by the Hossō-school Japanese monk Zenju (善珠, 723-797) in his *Inmyō ron sho myōtō shō* (因明論疏明燈抄) and the Ming-dynasty Chinese monk Zhenjie (真界, d.u.) in his *Yinming ru zhengli lun jie* (因明入正理論解), as well as the use of ‘inconsistency with one’s own words’ as a rhetorical tool by the Silla-era Korean monk Wŏnhyo (元曉, 617-686) in his *P’an piryang non* (判比量論). This material allows Zamorski to tentatively conclude:

The comparison between Chinese approaches to the fallacy of ‘inconsistency with one’s own words’ and their possible models extracted from Indian works extant in the Chinese Buddhist canon29 suggests that the interpretations of Chinese monks are not only original, but also in many ways superior to their antecedents in Indian literature (176).

Ching Keng begins the series of chapters nominally concerned with ‘Yogācāra ideas and authors’ with his paper entitled ‘A Re-examination of the Relationship between the *Awakening of Faith* and Dilun School Thought, Focusing on the works of Huiyuan’ (183-215). Keng focuses on what he characterizes as “the most distinctive doctrinal feature” (213) of the *Awakening of Faith* (*Dasheng qixin lun* 大乘起信論), viz. that “defiled phenomena are modes of the Truth or Thusness (*tathatā*)” (183) or, to put it in other words, that there is no distinction to be made “between unconditioned (*asamskṛta*) and

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29 Such as for example the *Tarka-śāstra* (*Rushi lun* 如實論) attributed to Vasubandhu (世親, 4-5th c.).
conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) dharms” (183). Supporters of the Chinese provenance of the *Awakening of Faith* have typically traced it back to the Dilun (i.e. *Daśabhūmikā*) School (地論宗) of which Huiyuan was the foremost master. But Keng’s paper argues that “Huiyuan has a very different understanding of the origin of defiled phenomena from that described in the *Awakening of Faith*” (185) – a doctrinal difference which “entitles us to conclude that the *Awakening of Faith* is not a direct outgrowth of Dilun School thought” (186). Keng’s innovative method is to “avoid citing any passages from works by Huiyuan in which the influence of the *Awakening of Faith* is most obvious” (189). As such, Keng’s approach runs counter to the prevalent use in relevant scholarship of Huiyuan’s *On the Meaning of the Eight Consciousnesses* (*Bashi yi* 八識義), an admittedly *Awakening of Faith*-influenced chapter within Huiyuan’s doxographical *Compendium of the Great Vehicle* (*Dasheng yi zhang* 大乘義章). Instead, Keng bases his argument primarily on alternative sections of the *Compendium of the Great Vehicle* (though he also utilizes several other of Huiyuan’s works). Having argued at length for his aforesaid conclusion, Keng proposes two further ramifications of his findings. Firstly, it emerges that Huiyuan’s opus should be divided into those works “evincing little or no influence from the *Awakening of Faith*, and those showing its strong influence” (212), with the former being characteristic of Dilun School thought while the latter are not. Secondly, Keng cautions us against “misinterpret[ing] Dilun School works by viewing them through the lens of the *Awakening of Faith*” (213). The importance of this point is such that I can do no better than quote the editors’ summary of it in full:

An important broader implication of Keng’s argument Huiyuan’s thought, Dilun thought, and even the thought of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* [*Lengqie jing* 楞伽經] has been anachronistically misinterpreted through the later, typically Chinese lens of the *Awakening of Faith*. This suggests the sobering possibility that typically ‘sinitic’ (or even ‘sinified’) developments became so pervasive in the later East Asian tradition that their stamp may still lie heavy upon parts of modern Budhhology itself, and that we might therefore overlook both evidence and products of ‘sinifying’ processes, and even the actual features of Indian materials (26).
The chapter by A. Charles Muller, entitled ‘A Pivotal Text for the Definition of the Two Hindrances in East Asia: Huiyuan’s “Erzhang yi” Chapter’ (217-270) focuses on Huiyuan’s *The Two Hindrances* (二障義). Indeed, the bulk of Muller’s contribution comprises a full and well annotated translation of this text (236-267), which constitutes another chapter from Huiyuan’s *Compendium of the Great Vehicle* (大乘義章). Muller translates the version of the text copied into the commentary to the *Awakening of Faith* known as the *Dasheng qixin lun yishu* (大乘起信論義疏) ascribed to Huiyuan or, if not the master himself, one of his close disciples. Muller’s accompanying notes are copious, ranging from editorial amendments of scribal errors, through citations of passages referred to by Huiyuan and Muller’s own references to other relevant passages in the Buddhist canon on the topic at hand, to historically attuned explanatory glosses. Apart from this translation, Muller’s contribution largely consists in introducing the work, and particularly in discussing its treatment of the “afflictive and cognitive obstacles to liberation [which] are formally organized under the rubrics of the ‘two hindrances’ – the afflictive hindrances (*kleśa-āvaraṇa*, *fannaozhang* 煩惱障) and the cognitive hindrances (*jñeya-āvaraṇa*; *zhizhang* 智障, *suozhizhang* 所知障)” (217-218). Muller argues counter to the prevailing view, according to which the two hindrances are “hallmark concepts of the Yogācāra school” (218), to demonstrate that they are in fact broadly Mahāyāna categories given most extensive expression in the Tathāgatagarbha tradition which developed in East Asia out of the Dilun school. Muller draws on an impressive array of primary sources, including most notably the *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra* (解深密經), *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra* (瑜伽師地論), *Mahāyānasamgraha* (攝大乘論), *Fodi jing lun* (佛地論 *Buddhabhūmi-śāstra-sūtra*), and *Cheng weishi lun* (成唯識論) for the Weishi-Yogācāra school; and the *Śrīmāladevi*-*[simhanāda]-sūtra* (勝鬘師子吼一乘大方便方廣經), *Ratnagotravibhāga* (究竟一乘寶性論), *Benye jing* (本業經), and *Dasheng qixin lun* (大乘起信論) for the Tathāgatagarbha tradition. Following two short sections outlining the ‘Parameters for the two hindrances’ (218-222) as understood through Wŏnhyo’s comprehensive treatise on the topic (entitled二障義just like Huiyuan’s work but translated differently by Muller as System of the Two Hindrances), and briefly stating some of the ‘Discrepancies’ (222-223)
between Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha understandings, Muller surveys ‘The Tathāgatagarbha system of the hindrances as explained by Huiyuan’ (224-229) as well as ‘The completed Yogācāra system of the hindrances’ (229-235). Although Muller admits that, “[i]n a general sense, the systems of the two hindrances are quite similar in their structure and function in Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha” (222), his analysis proposes the historical thesis that Huiyuan’s work (Tathāgatagarbhis in orientation, and significantly pre-dating the systematic articulations of the Yogācārins) may in fact have “spurred some Yogācāra scholars into action in this matter” (228).

The chapter by Junjie Chu, entitled ‘On the Notion of Kaidaoyi (*Avakāśadānāśraya) as Discussed in Xuanzang’s Cheng weishi lun’ (271-311), details Xuanzang’s understanding of kaidaoyi (開導依), “literally, ‘open-leading basis’, or ‘basis in terms of opening the way for the subsequent awareness and leading it to arise’”, the third of “the three bases of thought and thought concomitants (cittacaitta)” of “the seventh awareness, i.e. the defiled mind” (all 271). As Chu states, “[t]he main purpose of this paper is to examine the meaning of the two elements of the term kaidaoyi, namely kaidao and yi, analyzing their possible origin in the Indian sources of both the Abhidharma and the Yogācāra, and to propose a reconstruction of their original Sanskrit forms” (272). Chu initially argues that the first element in the term, kaidao, “must be a translation of the Sanskrit word avakāśadāna” (305) on the basis of a critical survey of the term’s uses and glosses in Kuiji’s commentary to Xuanzang’s text (i.e. the Cheng weishi lun shuji 成唯識論述記), Abhidharma treatises such as the Wushi piposhalun33 (五事毘婆沙論 *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā-śāstra) and Apidamo dapiposha lun (阿毘達摩大毘婆沙論 *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā), Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa[bhāṣya] (Apidamo jushe lun 阿毘達摩俱舍論), and the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yuqieshi lun 瑜伽師地論). On this basis, Chu then argues that the complete term, kaidaoyi, “reflects a different version of samanantarapratyaya, referring to the awareness that has passed away in the immediately antecedent moment, called ‘mind’, which has the function of giving way in order for the subsequent awareness to arise” (305). As such, Chu concludes that the term “is not a translation of the Sanskrit word *krāntāśraya, as Kuiji’s phonetic transcription jielanduo [羯爛多] suggests,

32 As he mentions, this last section but briefly summarizes Muller’s own more expansive treatments in Muller & Nguyen 2012 and Muller 2013.

33 Chu mistakenly transliterates the title as Wushi biposhalun.
but rather, of *avakāśadānāśraya, ‘basis that gives way’” (306). In the final section of his chapter, Chu outlines the three different interpretations of the function and nature of the term *avakāśadānāśraya discussed in Xuanzang’s base text and attributed by Kuiji to commentarial traditions founded by Nanda (難陀 d.u.), Sthiramati (安惠/安慧 c. 475-555), and Dharmapāla (護法 530-561) respectively. In all, Chu’s paper constitutes a clear example of how Chinese sources can function to not only reconstruct Sanskrit terms and illuminate Indic ideas, but also themselves meaningfully contribute to Buddhist epistemological thought.

The chapter by Zhihua Yao, entitled ‘Yogācāra Critiques of the Two Truths’ (313-335), uses “some scattered sources from Maitreyanātha [慈氏/弥勒, c. 270-350], Asaṅga [無著, 4-5th c.], and Vasubandhu [世親, 4-5th c.]… [to demonstrate] that they criticized the Madhyamaka version of the two truths doctrine on the basis of the Yogācāra theory of the three natures” (333). Yao’s chapter begins with his own reductionist critique of the Madhyamaka theory of two truths, and the author’s own affinity for the Yogācāra side of the debate is made clear at several subsequent points in the chapter. Thus, for example, Yao echoes his earlier characterization34 of the Mādhyamikas’ view of emptiness as one that leads to a “nihilist end” equivalent to claiming (in the words of the Yogācāra critique of Maitreyanātha) that “nothing exists” (一切皆無) – even though he admits that “[t]hose who are sympathetic to the Madhyamaka position may find this characterization inaccurate” (all 319). In any case, the main thrust of Yao’s contribution is not so much philosophical as historical: He is concerned to demonstrate that the aforementioned Yogācārin authors did in fact attack Madhyamaka tenets such as the two truths and emptiness prior to Bhāviveka’s (清辯/清辨, c. 500-578) well-known attack on the Yogācāra theory of the three natures in his Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā (中觀心論), its auto-commentary the Tarkajvāla (中觀心論諸思擇焰), and the Prajñāpradīpa (般若燈論) in the 6th century. Thus, Yao initially surveys the critiques of the “nihilist (nāstika)” (316) Madhyamaka position presented in the Yogācārabhūmi (瑜伽師地論) (which he, following the predominant Chinese tradition, ascribes to Maitreyanātha rather than Asaṅga), with subsidiary reference to its commentary, the Yugaron gi (Yuqielun ji 瑜伽論記), by the Korean scholar-monk Dunnyun/Dunlun (遁倫, also known as Doryun/Daolun 道倫, c. 650-730). Yao then charts the criticisms of the two

34 Cf. Yao 2010b, 84-85.
truths as found in the *Foxing lun* (佛性論) ascribed to Vasubandhu and translated into Chinese by Paramārtha (真諦, 499-569), and the *Shun zhong lun* (順中論) ascribed to Asaṅga and translated into Chinese by Gautama Prajñāruci (瞿曇般若流支, fl. 538-543). On Yao’s reading, these Yogācārin authors were concerned “to resist a dualistic tendency towards positing existence versus nonexistence, and to maintain a holistic worldview by going beyond this dualistic tendency” (333) purportedly characteristic of their Mādhyamika opponents. As a whole, Yao’s study rehearses and reinforces the well-established doxographical opposition between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools in that it seeks, in the words of the editors, “to correct misconceptions concerning the Buddhist approach to reality among contemporary scholars, who he regards have fallen under the influence of Madhyamaka; and to champion a Yogācāra perspective that he regards as more plausible and fruitful” (28). Given this aim, it is unfortunate that Yao was unable to take the more nuanced understandings of the two schools’ relationships, as detailed by the various contributors to Garfield and Westerhoff’s subsequently published volume (2015), into account.

The final section of the book, on ‘Other Indian ideas’, begins with a chapter by Hans-Rudolf Kantor entitled ‘Philosophical Aspects of Sixth-Century Chinese Buddhist Debates on “Mind and Consciousness”’ (337-395). Kantor frames his study of ‘mind and consciousness’ (心識) in terms of the inseparability or ‘conjunction of truth and falsehood’ (真妄和合 – Huiyuan’s formulation), a notion the ubiquity of which in the Madhyamaka/Sanlun (三論), Tathāgatagarbha, Yogācāra, Dilun, and Tiantai (天台) sources Kantor adduces shows, he claims, “that it may point in the direction of an essential and general feature of Chinese Mahāyāna thought” (337-338). As such, Kantor states his aim as “to discuss, analyze, compare, and identify, from a philosophical point of view, similarities and differences between the various views of the relationship between truth and falsehood prevalent in Mahāyāna Chinese Buddhist debates on ‘mind and consciousness’ in the sixth century” (340-341). To this end, Kantor devotes one section each to Madhyamaka, Tathāgatagarbha, and Yogācāra sources, followed by one section on the Dilun and Tiantai positions as exemplified in the writings of Huiyuan and Zhiyi (智顗, 538-597) respectively. The Madhyamaka view is presented primarily

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35 Yao mistakenly transliterates the Chinese name ‘Jutan Boreliuzhi’; it should be ‘Qutan Boreliuzhi’ – who is also known as Qutan Liuzhi (瞿曇流吉).
via the Zhong lun (中論) – the Chinese translation of Nāgārjuna’s (龍樹, c. 150-250) Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā inclusive of the commentary attributed to *Piṅgala (青目, 3rd c.) – as well as the Da zhi du lun (大智度論) *Mahaprajñāpāramitopadeśa attributed to Nāgārjuna and Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī (迴諍論). According to Kantor’s reading of these texts, dynamically differentiating truth and falsehood as correlatively dependent “in fact realizes inseparability, whereas separating, or seeing truth and falsehood as independent or mutually excluding realms, entails reifications confusing the two” (348 emphases original). Kantor’s survey of Tathāgatagarbha sources relies primarily on the Śrīmāladevī-sūtra, though in the course of his exposition Kantor also draws on sources as disparate as the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra (大般涅槃經) and relevant commentaries and treatises by Huiyuan, Zhiyi, Jizang (吉藏, 549-623), Kuiji, Fazang (法藏, 643-712), Zhanran (湛然, 711-782), and Chengguan (澄觀, 738-839). The following section “discusses truth and falsehood as they are viewed according to the Yogācāra concept of Mind in Asaṅga’s Compendium of the Great Vehicle (Mahāyānasamgraha-śāstra, She dasheng lun 攝大乘論) which centers on the doctrine of ālaya-consciousness” (364). Kantor states that “[c]ompared to that of Madhyamaka and Tathāgatagarbha, the Yogācāra interpretation of the relationship between truth and falsehood seems to resort to a more dualistic explanatory pattern” (372), though he adds that the teaching of the ‘three natures’ (trisvabhāva 三性) entails that even here truth and falsehood are “not completely separated from each other” (372). Finally, Kantor turns to indigenously Chinese debates on mind and consciousness, with specific focus on Huiyuan’s Treatise on the Meaning of the Great Vehicle (Dasheng yi zhang 大乘義章) and the Tiantai viewpoint espoused in Zhiyi’s Great Calming and Contemplation (Mohe zhi guan 摩訶止觀). Although Kantor describes significant differences in the ways his various sources understand mind and consciousness, he concludes that “the common basis of all the models discussed… is the constructivist approach to the sense of reality, which specifically examines the inseparability of truth and falsehood in both our understanding and the way we exist in the world” (394).

The chapter by Chien-hsing Ho, entitled ‘The Way of Nonacquisition: Jizang’s Philosophy of Ontic Indeterminacy’ (397-418), “examine[s] Jizang’s key writings in an attempt to clarify his ontological position” (398). In order to do so, Ho first provides a brief and uncontroversial reading of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness, on the understanding that this constituted the philosophical
groundwork for Jizang’s thought, as indeed for Sanlun thought more generally. He then takes Kumārajīva’s occasional translation of *svabhāva* as ‘determinate nature’ (定性) (in addition to its more established translation as ‘self-nature’ 自性) in his rendering of Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* (中論) as a springboard to discussion of ontological in/determinacy in Jizang’s forebear Sengzhao (僧肇, c. 374-414). On Ho’s reading of Sengzhao, “[t]he way the myriad things ordinarily appear to us is already saturated with concepts, which yet cannot accurately represent the way things really are” (401); that is, as ultimately “neither existent nor nonexistent” (403). According to Ho, Jizang takes Sengzhao’s account of the conventionally true perspectively determined “notional codependence” (401) of things, and conversely their supremely true “indeterminable state of quiescence” (405), as the direct basis for his own understanding of ontic indeterminacy. For Jizang, “the myriad things are codependent, indeterminate, and interrelated” (409), and true understanding of them is attained through what he refers to interchangeably as ‘nonacquisition’ (無得), ‘nonattachment’ (無執), or ‘nondependence’ (無依) (cf. 398). Ho devotes the final section of his paper to an investigation of Jizang’s conception of the ‘Way’ (道), although his argument often uses alternative terms such as ‘principle’ (理 e.g. 398) or ‘the Real’ (實相 e.g. 412-413) in its stead. Ho argues that Jizang’s ‘Way’ is variously understood as equivalent to nonacquisition (cf. 410), as “an ineffable nondual quiescence wherein both oneself and things are equal and conceptually undifferentiated” (412), as “virtually the same as the myriad things” (413), and as “the preeminent source of soteriological value” (416) depending on the particular perspective or level of truth Jizang is addressing at a given moment – all of which, Ho admits, “makes it difficult to ascertain his genuine stance” (414). As Ho himself acknowledges, whereas the works of Nāgārjuna (and of other Indian Mādhyamikas) “have been studied intensively by modern scholars” (398), the tentative nature of his own conclusions bespeaks the need for much further research in the philosophical yield of Jizang and his fellow Chinese heirs to Indian Madhyamaka.

The chapter by Yoke Meei Choong, entitled ‘Divided Opinion among Chinese Commentators on Indian Interpretations of the Parable of the Raft in the *Vajracchedikā*’ 419-469), is based on the Buddha’s espoused abandonment, at the climax of the parable of the raft found in both the *Majjhima-nikāya* (Middle Length Discourses 中阿含經) and the *Vajracchedikā* (Diamond-sūtra 金剛般若波羅密經), of both *dharma* (法) and *adharma* (非法). More particularly, Choong is concerned “to unravel the interrelationship of the Indian
and Chinese interpretations of dharma and adharma in the parable of the raft in the Vajracchedikā, and thereby to reveal the attitudes and behavior of the Chinese commentators toward Indian śūtras and commentaries” (420). To this end, Choong charts how the ambiguity of the two crucial terms led to differing interpretations among Indian commentaries to the Vajracchedikā mainly extant in Chinese (such as those by Vasubandhu and Asaṅga) and among indigenous Chinese commentaries by Zhiyi, Jizang, and Kuiji. Indeed, Choong carefully analyzes select passages to demonstrate that such commentarial differences among Chinese exegetes, and their Indian predecessors, followed “two distinct directions, that is, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra” (421). Following a survey of relevant variant readings in the six Chinese translations of the Vajracchedikā and a demonstration of the sectarian nature of these variants themselves, Choong goes on to treat at some length the Chinese Madhyamaka and Yogācāra interpretations, taking Zhiyi and Jizang to be affiliated with the former and Kuiji with the latter tradition (cf. 432). In so doing, Choong shows how the various and sectarianly colored commentarial interpretations were themselves based on the selective and strategic use of variant readings. Indeed, she goes on to argue that this hermeneutical division into Madhyamaka and Yogācāra trends was “already discernible in the Chinese translations of the Vajracchedikā itself” (450), such that the translations by Kumārajīva and Xuanzang are “compatible with the Madhyamaka” interpretation, whereas that by Paramārtha “propound[s] Yogācāra interpretations of the text” (453), and those by Bodhiruci, Yijing, and Gupta (笈多, also known as Dharmagupta 達摩笈多, d. 619) remain ambivalent due to either the absence of clear textual bias (Gupta), the presence of “mutually inconsistent” (452) translations (Yijing), or the co-presence of dual biases in differing textual versions (Bodhiruci). All this, coupled with her analysis of Indian interpretations of dharma and adharma, allows Choong to proffer some general conclusions as to “the most plausible interpretation of the parable of the raft in the Vajracchedikā” (458). Given the remit of the volume as a whole, however, it is perhaps even more worthwhile citing the assessment of Choong’s contribution on the part of the editors, who state forcefully that she shows that Chinese scholiast monks were quite capable of picking and choosing among the sources available to them with acute critical acumen, and artfully spinning those sources in the service of their own doctrinal agendas… A picture emerges of Chinese authors not as dupes to Chinese cultural presuppositions,
misunderstanding Indic sources, but rather, as equal and sophisticated contributors to an ongoing, pan-Buddhist discussion about the most consequential questions in large doctrinal systems, engaging with debates that were already conducted in similar terms... in India” (19).

To this I would only add that, though she does not address them directly within the confines of her paper, Choong effectively contributes to much wider debates in literary and translation studies as to the doctrinally subjective nature of purportedly neutral exercises in textual translation and hermeneutics.

The following chapter, by Michael Radich, is entitled ‘Ideas about “Consciousness” in Fifth and Sixth Century Chinese Buddhist Debates on the Survival of Death by the Spirit, and the Chinese Background to *Amalavijñāna’ (471-512). In it, Radich focuses

on tracing the place of concepts of consciousness in the debates... [“about whether or not some part of the sentient being does or does not survive death, to transmigrate and reap karmic rewards” (471, emphasis original)], from the early fifth to the early sixth centuries; and, particularly, on presenting a new interpretation of Liang Wudi’s (梁武帝, r. 502-549) Shenming cheng fo yi (神明成佛義, ‘On the Attainment of Buddhahood by the Shenming’) and its relation to its scriptural sources and intellectual-historical context (472).

Following brief surveys of the Buddhist positions of Lushan Huiyuan (盧山慧遠, 334-416), Zheng Daozi (鄭道子, d.u.), Zong Bing (宗炳, 375-443), and an anonymous Liu Song text perhaps by Huiguan (惠觀, d. c. 443-447), Radich turns to a more extended treatment of the treatise composed by Emperor Wu of the Liang dynasty and accompanied by “learned interlinear notes” (483) by Shen Ji (沈績, d.u.). Like its predecessors, this text is concerned to argue for the “survival of death” (473) of some component of the human being – a component typically conceived in terms of ‘consciousness’ (識), ‘spirit’ (神), ‘mind’ (心), or in any case “the mental component in the human being” (473) – on pain of

[36] Following the lead set by Itō Takatoshi, Radich also mentions the use of compound terms such as ‘mind-consciousness’ (心識) by Sengrou (僧柔, 431-494) and Zhizang (智藏, 458-522), and ‘true spirit’ (真神) by Baoliang (寶亮, 444-509) (cf. 495).
rendering the foundational Buddhist teaching of *karma* incoherent. Wudi’s term for this entity, “the single, fundamental ground of all the mind’s various ‘functions’ (yòng 用)” (483) is *shenming* (神明), which Radich renders as “spirit-cum-awareness/illumination” (cf. 483). Through detailed analysis of the intellectual history of this and related notions in texts such as the Śrīmāladevīśimhanāda-sūtra (勝鬘師子吼一乘大方廣方廣經), Mahāparinirvāṇa-mahāsūtra (大般涅槃經), and Cheng shi lun (成實論 *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* or *Satyasiddhi-śāstra*), as well as of the textual history of the term *shenming* in various Buddhist authors precedent to and, more abundantly, contemporary with Wudi, Radich shows that “Wudi’s essay is merely the tip of an iceberg of ideas current in his time, and quite representative of contemporary developments” (502). This leads Radich to more general historical and methodological conclusions. Perhaps most important among the former is Radich’s claim that the ideas he traces in this paper “could be regarded as forerunners to, and possible influences upon, the eventual formation of *amalavijñāna doctrine*” (506). Methodologically, Radich’s chapter (like many of the other contributions to the volume) effectively demonstrates that certain widely current scholarly conceptions as to the ‘sinification’ of Buddhist concepts – by which is often meant the supposed “Chinese failure to understand basic Buddhism” (473) – are in fact “excessively simplistic” (504).

Finally, the stated aim of the chapter by Michael Zimmermann, entitled ‘The process of Awakening in Early Texts on Buddha-Nature in India’ (513-528), is to throw some light on the question of how the authors of early texts on buddha-nature (*tathāgatagarbha, buddhadhātu* etc.) in India, in the first centuries of the Common Era, perceived the process of awakening, i.e. how they imagined the actual realization of this buddha-nature, and how they described this process in terms of their own underlying vision (513).

Zimmermann’s contribution is thus based predominantly on Indian sources, especially the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* (如來藏經) but also the *Ratnagotravibhāga-vyākhyā* (究竟一乘寶性論), with subsidiary reference to the *Tathāgatotpattisambhava-nirdeśa* first translated into Chinese as *Fo shuo

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37 Radich also cites uses of other terms such as ‘consciousness’ (識), ‘mind’ (心), ‘fundamental consciousness’ (本識), ‘spirit-cum-consciousness’ (神識), and ‘consciousness-cum-spirit’ (識神) by Wudi and Shen Ji (N.B.: Radich transliterates but does not translate the latter two terms; their English renderings are mine).
*rulai xingxian jing* (佛說如來興顯經) by Dharmarakṣa (竺法護, c. 239-316) and no longer extant in the Sanskrit original. Zimmermann argues that, in these early texts, “two basic concepts of how buddha-nature should be imagined come to light” (514); concepts which he goes on to explain in terms of ‘disclosure’ and ‘development’. According to the theory of disclosure, “living beings already carry perfect buddhahood within themselves… this core [, which] is unknown to the living beings themselves… [and] which all sentient beings have carried within themselves since beginningless time, is already perfect. In itself, it needs no transformation, no refinement, no change at all” (515). By contrast, according to the theory of development, “buddha-nature is an element… not yet fully developed… a germ or an embryo which still needs further ripening and appropriate nurturing in circumstances which would allow this element to come to full perfection” (516). On the basis of this two-fold conception of Buddha-nature in the earliest Indian texts on the topic, Zimmermann goes on to argue briefly for a series of related points; namely that “the early beginnings of buddha-nature thought in India were based on a view which focused on the individual as the major anchoring point and described the issue of awakening from this perspective” (519); that “the exact role of the Buddha on the path to realization is not completely clear” (519) at this stage; and that “the main point seems merely to be to promulgate the new idea that all sentient beings have buddha-nature” (520). This last point leads Zimmermann to “conceive of the oldest layer of buddha-nature texts as belonging to a branch of Mahāyāna Buddhism which is more oriented towards factors of religious emotionality [particularly in terms of śraddha – “religious confidence and motivation” (522)] as crucial in the process of attaining liberation” (523). Zimmermann’s article then closes with a brief discussion of the ‘efficacy of buddhahood’, understood in terms of the characteristics automatically manifested by an individual who has attained the realization of Buddha-nature.

The end matter of book includes biographical introductions to the authors, and a detailed index. This last is particularly comprehensive as it includes alphabetical entries to concepts in both Sanskrit and Chinese (transliterated in pinyin) as well as their English translations, and proper names of individuals, schools, and works. Certain entries are marked in bold, but the method by which these emphasized passages have been selected is not stated; nor are the passages in bold prima facie the ones that treat the given entry in necessarily the most sustained manner. No consolidated bibliography is provided, though each chapter ends with its own bibliographical matter.
Overall, then, *A Distant Mirror* is a meticulously researched contribution to the study of sixth and seventh century Chinese Buddhist philosophy, particularly as it relates to its Indic antecedents. The book consistently includes the classical Chinese and Sanskrit terms and passages it discusses, and employs an impressive range of primary and secondary sources in these and other languages (primarily Japanese and English, occasionally Tibetan). The several chapters make important contributions to their respective topics, though (in case my detailed review of the several chapters did not make this clear enough) it should be stated that these contributions are typically highly specific. Indeed, the specialized nature of the several chapters’ treatment of their highly varied subject matters, coupled with their invariably fine-grained approach to the texts under analysis, means that this volume is certainly not intended for the general reader. The individual chapters could well have appeared in any number of the specialist journals mentioned in their bibliographies, such that it will doubtless be the rare reader indeed who works through this hefty volume from cover to cover. What rescues the book as a whole from being merely a heterogeneous collection of articles is its editorial focus on specific sets of issues as elaborated by Chinese Buddhist thinkers on the basis of Indian Buddhist forebears within a specific time frame. Within these parameters, *A Distant Mirror* succeeds in what Zimmermann refers to in his ‘Foreword’ as the collective aims of the authors to push back against a certain parochializing tendency to relegate the study of Chinese materials to the study of questions pertaining to China alone… to problematize a prevalent notion of ‘sinification’, which has led scholars to consider the relation of Indic to Chinese materials predominantly in terms of the ways Indic ideas and practices were transformed into something ostensibly distinctive to China… [and] to go beyond another paradigm, that of seeing the sixth and seventh centuries in China primarily as the age of the formation and establishment of the so-called ‘sects’ or ‘schools’ of ‘Chinese’ Buddhism… Instead, by bracketing out possibly essentializing notions of ‘India’ and ‘China’, these studies attempt to view the ideas they study on their own terms – as valid Buddhist ideas, finding their existence in a rich, ‘liminal’ space of interchange between two large traditions (10-11).
As such, perhaps the most lasting contribution of *A Distant Mirror* to Buddhist studies resides less in the detailed additions to specialist learning made by its individual chapters than in book’s entire methodology. As a pre-eminent embodiment of methodologically sophisticated scholarship in Chinese Buddhist philosophy that consciously transcends outdated and untenable assumptions as to the primal authenticity and supreme distinction of Indian Buddhist thought, *A Distant Mirror* should be required reading for any specialist of Buddhist philosophy in any of its myriad manifestations.

**Bibliography**


BOOK REVIEWS


